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agreements is understandable. The agreements offer an innova-
tive payment model under which payers reimburse manufac-
turers on the basis of health outcomes achieved rather than
products provided [1–3]. In theory, the effects of these arrange-
ments can be far-reaching, promising to improve population
health and drive systemwide efﬁciencies [1,4].
The hype around risk-sharing agreements, however, has
always seemed to outpace the accomplishments. Despite an
abundance of articles, presentations, and discussions on the topic,
actual experience has demonstrated that they are challenging to
execute [5]. Barriers include high implementation costs, measure-
ment issues, a lack of trust between payers and product manu-
facturers, and the absence of a suitable data infrastructure [5]. For
many potential partners, negotiating price discounts has proven
easier and less risky than entering into risk-sharing agreements.
Given the disconnect between expectations and reality, the
new ISPOR Task Force Report on Performance-Based Risk-Sharing
Arrangements (PBRSAs) is a welcome development [6]. The entire
ﬁeld will beneﬁt from its clear-eyed analysis and guidance on
good practices for the design, implementation, and evaluation of
the arrangements. Experience has shown that ISPOR Task Force
reports become well-cited and used reference documents. They
reﬂect consensus efforts by multidisciplinary teams with input
provided by the broader ISPOR membership. At their best, they
provide a framework for organizing and critiquing key issues and
questions, and they furnish a practical set of recommendations
for the ﬁeld. The PBRSA Task Force follows in this tradition,
drawing in part on previous task force reports on modeling,
retrospective database analysis, prospective observational stu-
dies, and real-world data [7–12].
The PBRSA Task Force Report is notable in several ways. First,
it provides a useful taxonomy for PBRSAs. Part of the problem
with risk-sharing agreements has been a lack of clear and
consistent terminology and classiﬁcation. As the Task Force
report notes, PBRSAs can fall under a variety of names and
categories, including outcomes-based schemes, risk-sharing
agreements, coverage with evidence development, access with
evidence development, patient access schemes, conditional
licensing, and managed entry schemes. Many agreements adver-
tised as “risk sharing” are actually price discounts (sometimes
cleverly disguised), which do not tie payment explicitly to
product performance [5,13]. The PBRSA Task Force Report use-
fully distinguishes payer-manufacturer arrangements that mea-
sure health outcomes in characterizing performance from those
that do not. They further differentiate outcomes-based arrange-
ments that attempt to directly manage utilization and guarantee
cost-effectiveness (i.e., “utilization-based”) versus those that
include a strong research element (i.e., “research-based”).ial support: The author has no other ﬁnancial relaSecond, the Task Force highlights the potential value of
PBRSAs in reducing uncertainty through additional data collec-
tion. As the report notes, a PBRSA is perhaps best thought of as a
“mechanism for reducing uncertainty through greater invest-
ment in evidence collection while a technology is in use within
a health care system.” The intention is to provide a different
distribution of risk between the payer and the manufacturer
compared with the historical relationship between the parties.
Furthermore, PBRSAs can reduce uncertainty through data
collection related to product effectiveness in various ways. For
example, they might address broader populations than those
used in registration trials, or collect evidence on end points not
considered in trials, such as adherence, hospitalization, or longer
term clinical outcomes. As the report notes, which PBRSA
research design is most suitable in any given situation will
depend on the nature and type of the uncertainty that the
evidence collection is trying to address.
Third, the Task Force highlights that PBRSAs have “public good”
aspects, which should be considered from a policy perspective. In
part that means that public authorities who negotiate and fund
evidence-generating arrangements should make the results of that
research public where possible. But the Task Force goes further,
pointing out that private insurers, who seek valid scientiﬁc answers
to the outcomes questions embedded in the arrangements, should
also be encouraged to put ﬁndings in the public domain, as long as
it does not deter them from negotiating agreement in the ﬁrst place.
Importantly, the Task Force argues that the societal desir-
ability of PBRSAs is fundamentally a value-of-information ques-
tion, comparing the societal costs of additional data collection
with the societal beneﬁts of improved resource-allocation deci-
sions. Moreover, the report adds that as an innovation in and of
them, PBRSAs should also be evaluated from a long-run societal
perspective in terms of their impact on dynamic efﬁciency
(eliciting the optimal amount of innovation).
Finally, the Task Force highlights research and operational “good
practices,” emphasizing issues related to design, implementation,
evaluation, and governance. It notes that outcomemeasures should
be selected with care, that they should be clear, measurable,
objective, realistically achievable, and relevant. Ideally, this means
that parties should address a series of questions before entering into
agreements: What is the speciﬁc research design? Is the time
horizon realistic? Is the funding arrangement clear? Who is respon-
sible for data collection and analysis? What is the process for
reviewing and analyzing the evidence in order to make a revised
decision on price, revenue, or coverage? Will discounts or rebates be
paid on the basis of provisional results? The Task Force adds that to
the extent possible, certain matters should be prespeciﬁed, includ-
ing arrangements about access to data, opportunities for stake-
holder input, rules about reporting of results, and so forth.tionships to disclose.
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Task Force’s discussion of experience with the agreements in
different countries indicates a great deal of interest and ongoing
experimentation, suggesting that the model may be in a pro-
tracted but early stage of evolution. Whether they truly take off or
muddle along in the years ahead remains to be seen. Whatever
the outcomes, the work of the PBRSA Task Force will sharpen the
debate and solidify the foundation.
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